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Copyright ©In this paper, we construct a framework within which we explore how incentives and infor-
mation structures inﬂuence the ability of a collection of individuals to make an accurate
aggregate prediction. In our framework, individuals of bounded ability predict outcomes
that depend on the values of a set of attributes. Individual construct models consider only
a subset of those attributes, and those models depend on their incentives and their informa-
tion environments. We consider two types of incentive structures: one in which individuals
get paid on the basis of accuracy and one based on market like, for example, parimutuel
payoffs. We also consider two information environments: one in which individuals learn
in isolation and another in which they can copy more successful predictors. We ﬁnd that
market incentives and isolated learning environments produce the most accurate aggregate
predictions but that these same incentives and information structures also produce the
least accurate individuals. Thus, the incentives and informational structures that produce
collective wisdom may hinge on their ability to produce and maintain diversity. Copyright
© 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.1. INTRODUCTION
The efﬁcient functioning of organizations as well as
markets and democracies requires that collections of
individuals be capable of making accurate assessments
of current and future events (Von Hayek, 1945; Ober,
2008). Often, these institutions demand that the crowd
be more accurate than its constituent members (Woolley
et al., 2010). Theoretical models demonstrate that this
desired emergent collective accuracy requires a combi-
nation of individual expertise and collective diversity
(Ladha, 1992; Armstrong, 2001; Page, 2007; Ray,ce to: Scott E. Page, Departments of Political
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versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA. Email:
mail.com
2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.2006). These extant theoretical results provide sufﬁcient
conditions for collective accuracy but leave open the
question of how those conditions emerge. That is the
subject that we address here: how do wise crowds
emerge? And, in particular, what roles do information
structures and incentives play in producing them?
To answer these questions, we construct a frame-
work within which we vary incentive and information
structures. Incentives to make correct predictions
should promote individual accuracy, yet if individuals
are bounded or if the problem is computationally com-
plex, individuals may not identify the best predictors
(Aragones et al., 2005). Incentives to be correct need
not, however, create diversity. Although some diver-
sity should occur just by chance—the opinions and
forecasts of individuals who possess only partial and
diverse information and models of limited cognitive
L. HONG ET AL.324depth need not be the same even under rational learning
(Al-Najjar, 2009)—more is probably needed. To that
end, we explore the ability of market like incentives,
in which being correct when others are wrong yields
large rewards, to produce and maintain diversity.
Our main ﬁndings are that market-based incentives
improve collective accuracy and that social learning,
in which individuals can share models, reduces it.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the incentive and informa-
tion structures that lead to the most accurate collec-
tives also produce the least accurate individuals. This
result arises because collective accuracy requires
diversity, and the mechanisms that produce diversity
do so by reducing individual accuracy. Thus, organi-
zations that estimate values, be they investment banks
evaluating stocks, government agencies evaluating
solvency, or ﬁrms evaluating market demands might
do well to worry as much about incentivizing people
to think differently as they do about improving indi-
vidual accuracy.
In our framework, we assume an outcome function
that maps a set of attribute values into either a good or
bad outcome. These attributes take on binary values.
Individuals choose to look at some subset of those
attributes and construct predictive models that map
the attribute values they consider into predicted out-
comes. The accuracy of an interpreted signal depends
on the number of attributes that the individual consid-
ers (the more the better) and the nature of the outcome
function.
Our model builds from the interpretive signal
framework of Hong and Page (Hong & Page, 2009),
which enables us to capture diversity by the overlap
in the attributes considered. If two individuals include
non-overlapping subsets of attributes, their predictions
will be negatively correlated. If the individuals
consider identical attributes, their predictions will be
perfectly correlated.
In what follows, we consider outcome functions
that rely on a threshold. If a weighted average of the
attribute values exceeds a threshold, the outcome is
good. Otherwise, the outcome is bad. Individuals learn
which attributes to include in their model as well as
what weights to place on those attributes. Individuals
also have a cost associated with adding more attri-
butes. This cost prevents them from considering all
of the attributes in their models. Over time, they learn
to balance the informational beneﬁts of adding more
attributes against the cognitive or acquisitional costs
of having a more sophisticated model.
We consider two information structures. In the ﬁrst,
we isolate the individuals. Each must construct aCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.predictive model on its own. In the second, the indivi-
duals meet others and can copy their models. We call
this social learning.1 We also consider two types of
incentives. Under individual incentives, an individual
earns a payoff if it correctly predicts the outcome in
that period, whereas under market incentives, an
individual earns a payoff proportional to the inverse
of the percentage of other individuals who predicted
correctly. Thus, if twice as many individuals predict
correctly, an individual only earns half as much.2 In
total then, we have four scenarios, and for each we
measure (i) the accuracy of the individual predictive
models that emerge; (ii) the diversity of those models;
and (iii) the collective accuracy of all of the models.
Our emphasis on how incentives and informational
structure inﬂuence the predictive models that indivi-
duals select differs from the bulk of the information
aggregation literature in economics that focuses on
the incentives for individuals to truthfully reveal and
to gather information (Feddersen & Pesendorfer,
1997; Piketty, 1999; Hanson, 1999; Chen et al.,
2010). Here, we assume that individuals have incen-
tives to reveal their predictions and to gather the
relevant information to make those predictions. We
do not deny the incentive issues exist with regards to
revelation; we just choose to focus on an aspect of
the problem that to date has been largely unex-
plored—the emergence of the accuracy and diversity
of individual predictions based on information and
incentives.
The remainder of this paper consists of three parts.
In the ﬁrst, we describe the basic framework and
present some basic mathematical insights that follow
from the model’s construction. In the second part,
we describe the results from a computational model
for four classes of functions (Miller & Page, 2008).
In the ﬁnal part, we discuss the implications of our
ﬁndings for organizations and societies that wish to
produce emergent collective wisdom.2. FRAMEWORK
In our framework, there exists a binary outcome, that
is, either good or bad, that depends on the state of
the world. The state of the world can be written as a
vector of M binary attributes.
The state of the world x = (x1, x2, . . . xM) where
xi2 {1, 1}
The outcome function F : (x1, x2, . . . xM)! {0, 1}.Manage. Decis. Econ. 33: 323–334 (2012)
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Figure 1. Our four scenarios.
INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND EMERGENT COLLECTIVE ACCURACY 325We consider the ability of a population of N indivi-
duals to predict that outcome using majority rule
voting. Each of these individuals relies on a predictive
model that considers a subset of the attributes. Let
Sj denote the subset of the attributes {1, 2,. . . .M}
considered by individual j.
The predictive model of individual j Mj xj
 
j2Sj
 
! 0; 1f g.
We say that the predictive model of an individual is
correct if it agrees with the outcome function, and the
accuracy of a predictive model equals the percentage
of the time that it is correct. The collective accuracy
of the population of N predictive models equals the
percentage of the time that a majority of the indivi-
duals make the correct prediction.
We will say that a predictive model is optimal if
it maximizes accuracy conditional on the attributes
included in the model. As a general rule, if two indivi-
duals consider many of the same attributes, and arrive
at optimal predictive models, then their predictions
will be positively correlated. If they consider different
attributes, their predictions will be negatively corre-
lated. We can therefore use the overlap in attributes
used in models as a proxy for the diversity of predic-
tions from those models.
Incentives and Information. We initially endow the
individuals with random predictive models in a way
we make formal below. Over time they learn based on
their available information and their incentives. We
consider two different incentive structures. Our ﬁrst
incentive structure considers only an individual’s accu-
racy. Individuals who predict correctly get paid. Those
that predict incorrectly do not. We call these individual
incentives. Our second incentive structure creates a pool
of money that gets divided among those who pick
correctly. Thus, we call these market incentives because
they capture an essential feature of ﬁnancial markets:
predicting correctly when everyone else does as well
yields a much smaller payoff than predicting correctly
when everyone else is wrong.
individual incentives: the payoff to an individual
equals 1 if his or her model predicts correctly and
0 otherwise.
market incentives: the payoff to an individual who
predicts correctly equals N/Nc where NC equals the
total number of individuals who predict correctly
and 0 otherwise.
We also consider two learning environments. In the
ﬁrst, no information is shared among the individuals.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.In the second, individuals can see the performance of
other agents and copy their models if the other agents
are earning higher payoffs.
isolated learning: an individual compares a model
based on a randomly chosen set of attributes
against his or her current model. He or she
switches only if the new model produces a higher
payoff.
social learning: with probability θ an individual
relies on isolated learning and with probability
(1 θ) he or she chooses a random individual (in-
cluding possibly himself or herself) and compares
that individual’s model against his or her own. In
each case, he or she switches only if the new model
produces a higher payoff.
Combining the incentive structures and learning
environments produces four scenarios shown in Figure 1.
2.1. Learning Rules for Individuals
We now describe the speciﬁc learning rules that we
encode in our computational implementations of these
four scenarios. The computer programs consist of four
parts: initialization, model reﬁnement, model switch-
ing, and evaluation. The particulars of the various
outcome functions that we use will be postponed until
the results section.
Initialization. We construct N individual agents as
follows. Each agent is assigned a set of K randomly
chosen attributes from the M attributes that describe
the state of the world. These K attributes combine to
partition the 2M possible states of the world into 2K
categories. For example, if K= 1, then the set of
possible worlds is partitioned into one category in
which the attribute has value 1 and one category in
which it has value 1. We then construct a look-up
table for each individual that keeps track of past states
of the world as well as payoffs, by assigning each
state of the world to its corresponding category andManage. Decis. Econ. 33: 323–334 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
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This look-up table also contains the individual’s pre-
diction. As an individual has no prior knowledge
about the relationship between the attributes consid-
ered in his or her model and the outcome, the initial
predictions are random. Each agent also has a cumula-
tive payoff. This equals the sum of all payoffs to date
minus the costs of looking at attributes. We assume
that each attribute considered has a cost c per period.
This cost corresponds to the informational or atten-
tional cost of paying attention to an attribute’s value.
Model Reﬁnement. We now describe how the
agents update this look up table to reﬁne their models.
Under individual incentives, the payoff associated
with a prediction will be 1 if the prediction is correct
and 0 if the prediction is incorrect. Therefore, a lookup
table for an individual who considers two attributes
after 20 periods might look like Figure 2. Notice that
this individual would predict good outcomes when
his or her two attributes take opposite values and bad
outcomes when they take the same value.
Under market incentives, the payoffs depend on the
number of people who predict correctly, so the individ-
ual may prefer to predict the less likely outcome because
it has a higher expected payoff. Under market incen-
tives, rather than add one to the correct column after
each period, we add an amount equal to N/Nc, where
NC is the number who predicted correctly. In either
scenario, after each period, an individual records the re-
ward he or she received and updates his or her look-up
table by incrementing the incentives for making positive
and negative predictions given the state of the world.
Model Switching. In all of our scenarios, agents
can also switch their models. In the isolated learning
environment, model switching involves adding, drop-
ping, or switching an attribute. In the social learning
environment, model switching can also include aban-
doning one’s own model for that of someone whoFigure 2. A look-up table after 20 p
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.has earned a higher payoff. First, for isolated learning,
we assume that with some ﬁxed probability, pd, an in-
dividual decides to assess the usefulness of each the
attributes he or she considers. With probability(1 pd)
he or she does nothing to his or her model.
When an individual evaluates his or her attributes,
he or she does so by comparing its added value in
accuracy to the costs of looking at that additional
attribute. He or she does this by rerunning history for
300 periods and determining his or her payoff had he
or she not included the attribute. If he or she does
not have 300 periods of data in his or her memory,
he or she uses what data he or she has available. Drop-
ping an attribute will generally lower accuracy, but it
could increase the payoff by reducing costs. Note also
that in the market incentive scenarios, lower accuracy
need not imply a lower payoff even without consider-
ing costs. In all cases, we assume that if dropping
the attribute would have led to a higher payoff, the
individual drops it. Note that if an individual drops
an attribute, then rows of the look-up table can be
combined because he or she now relies on fewer
categories.
If, on the other hand, all of his or her attributes
are worth keeping, then the agent chooses a random
attribute to add. If an individual adds a new random
attribute to his or her model, he or she must add
columns to his or her look-up table. We assume there-
fore that he or she starts with an empty look-up table.
This asymmetry could be avoided if all individuals
kept track of all of the attributes of all states of the
world, but this would be empirically implausible.
Thus, even though this assumption introduces an
asymmetry related to the adding and dropping of
attributes, we believe it to be the most sensible choice.
Under social learning, individuals apply the proce-
dure just described with probability θ, and with
probability 1 θ, they randomly pick some othereriods given individual incentives.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 33: 323–334 (2012)
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individual has a higher cumulative payoff, then the
ﬁrst individual copies the look-up table of the second.
We assume that he or she also copies the values
within those columns. In other words, under our social
learning assumption, we assume that individuals share
the details of their models with one another. With
some small probability (we used 0.05), the ﬁrst
individual makes a mistake in copying, in which case
he or she substitutes a random attribute for one of
the attributes to be copied and starts with an empty
look-up table. This captures an individual getting an
idea for a new model upon hearing someone else’s
model.
Evaluation. To evaluate the individuals and the
collective, we keep track of three time series of data.
First, we keep track of the average individual accu-
racy: the average percentage of periods in which each
individual predicts correctly. Note that this equals the
average payoff in the individual incentives scenario.
We also keep track of the collective accuracy, which
we calculate to be the average accuracy of the majority
decision. If a majority predicts that the outcome is
good and it is good, then the collective is correct.
Finally, as mentioned in our construction of the frame-
work, diversity over the attributes considered will be a
proxy for negatively correlated individual predictions
and therefore a more accurate collective. Therefore,
we also keep track of the diversity of the predictive
models.
There are several ways that we could capture model
diversity. One way would be to consider all possible
models that an individual might use and then to
compute a diversity measure over that distribution.
This approach creates computational difﬁculties in that
the set of possible models is so large. An alternative
approach is to capture model diversity by considering
the distribution over the attributes considered in the
models. This second approach gives a cruder measure
of the actual model diversity, but it is more easily
calculated and as our ﬁndings reveal, proves sufﬁcient
to capture model diversity. Note also that when each
individual considers only a single attribute, these two
approaches will be the same.
To make this formal, we ﬁrst compute R, the total
number of attributes considered by all individuals.
We then calculate the number of individuals that
consider attribute i. Call this ri. The probability vector
r1
R ;
r2
R ; . . . ;
rM
R
 
denotes the percentage of people who
look at each attribute. To calculate the diversity of this
vector, we use the diversity index.3Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Let pi be the fraction of individuals who con-
sider attribute i. We deﬁne the diversity index of
the population as a function of the fraction of
individuals considering each of the M attributes,
DIV p1; p2; . . . ; pMð Þ ¼ 1PM
i¼1 p
2
i
The diversity index is constructed so that if each
individual considers the same two attributes, the
index will equal two (DIV 12 ;
1
2 ; 0; . . . ; 0
  ¼ 2), and
if the individuals spread attention evenly across all M
attributes, the diversity will equal M.
2.2. Classes of Functions
We analyze this model for four classes of functions:
equally weighted linear, linear with a dominant attri-
bute, general linear functions, and linear with nonlin-
ear interactions. By analyzing the ﬁrst class, we can
compare the abilities of the various incentive and
informational structures to maintain diversity against
drift. The second class enables us to see how the
structures create a balance between individual accu-
racy (focusing on the dominant attribute) and collec-
tive diversity. The third class subsumes the ﬁrst two
classes and enables us to see if the results found for
the more special cases hold generally. The ﬁnal class
provides a context to see some of the limits of collec-
tive accuracy (Page & Toole, 2011). Unless the indivi-
duals can absorb all the interaction terms within their
models, they will not be able to make accurate collec-
tive predictions.
2.3. The Dynamics over Models
Prior to presenting our ﬁndings, we ﬁrst present some
mathematical formalism that provides a foundation
for the results that follow. In the ﬁrst case that we
consider, we assume that the outcome function takes
the following form:
Fb xð Þ ¼ d
XM
i¼1
bxi
" #
;
where d(y) = 1 if y≥ 0 and 0 otherwise, and b> 0
We furthermore assume that M is odd so that all
outcomes are either good or bad. Note that under
individual learning and no model switching, in the long
run an individual will construct an optimal predictive
model based on the attributes he or she considers. This
follows directly from the law of large numbers.
Also note that given the symmetry, any two predic-
tive models that consider the same number of attri-
butes will be equally accurate in the long run. Thus,Manage. Decis. Econ. 33: 323–334 (2012)
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tive and information structures produce and maintain
diversity. The production of diversity will not be a
problem given our assumption that individuals choose
models randomly. In fact, if the individuals couldsolated; Individual :
1
2
þ 1
2M
;
1
2M
;
1
2M
; . . . ;
1
2M
 	
ocial; Individual :
1
2
þ θþ 1 θð Þk
t
1
2M
;
θþ 1 θð Þkt2
2M
; . . . ;
θþ 1 θð ÞktM
2M
 	
solated; Market :
M  J þ L
2










M
;
2dJ 2ð Þ þ dL 2ð Þ
2M
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2dJ Mð Þ þ dL Mð Þ
2M
0
BB@
1
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ocial; Market :
N  J þ L
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M
;
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2M
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θþ 1 θð ÞkMð Þ 2dJ Mð Þ þ dL Mð Þ½ 
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0
BB@
1
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:I
S
I
Smaintain their initial diversity over attributes and
optimize those models, then they would always make
accurate predictions for this class of functions. This
result follows from the fact that the distribution over
models will be a Bernoulli distribution. However,
given that an individual can also change the attributes
that they consider, both through model reﬁnement and
model switching, the distribution over models will
drift over time. This drift away from an equal distribu-
tion will result in less accuracy, at least in this case.
To give some insight into the dynamics of model
reﬁnement and model switching, we ﬁrst consider a
restricted case in which each individual’s model may
only consider one attribute at any time. In this special
case, the dynamics of the system become analytically
tractable. The results we derive will allow us to form
some hypotheses about the diversity that will emerge
under each of the four learning and reward scenarios.
For simplicity, we assume that in each period, only
one individual can switch his or her model. Let
kt1; k
t
2; . . . ; k
t
M
 
denote the distribution of individuals
across attributes at time t. In what follows, we assume
that the number of states of the world for which the
two models are compared during the learning phase,
is sufﬁciently large that if one model has a higher
expected payoff, then the individual will switch to that
model. Without loss of generality, we assume that
individual who learns in period t considers attribute
1. Let J={j : kj< k1} denote the attributes that are chosen
with less frequency than 1 andL ¼ ‘ : k‘ ¼ k1f g denoteCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the set of attributes chosen with identical frequency. Let
dJ(i) = 1 if i2 J and 0 otherwise. Deﬁne dL(i) similarly.
Given these assumptions, we can write the distribu-
tion over models in the next period for each of our four
scenarios as follows:Comparing the expressions shows that isolated
learning with individual incentives will result in an
unbiased random walk across the M models. Maximal
collective accuracy does not require equal numbers of
each model. For example, with ﬁve models, a distribu-
tion of (3, 5, 5, 6, 6) would be just as accurate as
an equal distribution. Overall then, we should expect
isolated learning with individual incentives to perform
well but at times it may drift toward distributions in
which a few models dominate and accuracy will fall.
Under social learning with individual incentives,
the process will be more likely to drift toward models
based on attributes that have greater representation in
the population even though those models are not more
accurate. Thus, we should expect social learning to be
much less accurate than under isolated learning.
Under isolated learning with market incentives,
those models that are less represented will receive
higher payoffs. As a result, the drift will be toward
those models, thereby creating a drift that is biased
toward equal numbers of the models. We should ex-
pect greater collective accuracy because a more even
distribution across models will be maintained. Finally,
under social learning with market incentives, we see a
bias toward models that exist in equal or lower propor-
tion but that bias is attenuated by the fact that less
represented attributes will be chosen less frequently
during social learning. Comparing across these distri-
butions, we expect that social learning should lead to
less collective accuracy than individual learning, andManage. Decis. Econ. 33: 323–334 (2012)
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accuracy.
So far, we have assumed that each model is equally
accurate. If we suppose that some models are more
accurate than others, then we may no longer want an
equal distribution across the models. Instead, the more
accurate models should obtain more weight. Under
individual incentives, we should expect a drift toward
those more accurate models leading to less diversity,
although more accurate individual predictions. That
drift will be even more pronounced under social learn-
ing. Under market based incentives, the larger payoff
from being in the minority should attenuate that
drift toward individual accuracy and maintain some
diversity. However, the market incentives may not
prove sufﬁcient in all cases. Consider functions of
the following form:
Fb xð Þ ¼ d
X4
i¼1
bixi
" #
;
where b1> b2>b3> b4> 0 and b2 + b3 + b4>b1>
b2 +b3. The outcome will be good if F has a positive
value and bad otherwise. Given these assumptions, a
model that considers only attribute one will be correct
unless all of the other three attributes take the opposite
sign. Thus, it will be correct with probability 7/8. The
models that consider the other attributes will be correct
if either attribute one takes the same sign, (probability
1/2) or if attribute one takes the opposite sign and the
other two attributes take the same sign (probability 1/8).
The optimal allocation of individuals across attributes
would be to have fewer than half of the individuals con-
sider attribute one and to also have fewer than half of the
individuals consider any subset of the other attributes. It
can be shown that any distribution that satisﬁes those
two assumptions will always yield an accurate collective
prediction. In other words, the optimal distribution across
attributes will not be maximally diverse.
In the long run, individual incentives will lead to
everyone choosing the same model, which will not be
optimal. And, as we now show, market incentives will
also fail to produce an optimal distribution in equilibrium.
Let pi denote the proportion of individuals that choose
a model that considers attribute i. By symmetry, it fol-
lows that p2 =p3 = p4. Let this proportion equal p so that
p1 = 1 3p. Given market incentives, the payoff to the
model that considers attribute 1 as a function of p equals
p1 pð Þ ¼ 18 1þ
3
1 pþ
3
1 2p
 	
:Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.The payoff to an individual whose model considers
attribute j 6¼ 1 equals
pj pð Þ ¼ 18 1þ
2
1 pþ
1
1 2pþ
1
3p
:
 	
Setting these two expressions equal gives 11pþ
2
12p ¼ 13p, and rearranging terms gives 3p 6p2 + 6p
6p2 = 1 3p + 2p2. This reduces to 14p2 12p + 1= 0,
which has a solution p = 0.0935. This formal argument
shows that even though market incentives produce
diversity in equilibrium, that diversity will be insufﬁ-
cient to produce collective accuracy. In this particular
case, the diversity index in equilibrium will equal
1.836. One can show that in order for the collective
to predict accurately, the diversity index must lie in
the interval [0, 2].43. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
We now present results from a computational model.
We present results from experiments with 101 agents
although the qualitative results hold for a wide range
of parameters.5 In what follows, we take average
values over individual runs of 30,000 periods. If we
treat each period as a data point, then all of the
differences that we present are signiﬁcant at the
p= 0.01 level.Linear Functions with Five Equal Attributes. We
ﬁrst consider linear functions with ﬁve attributes. In
this ﬁrst set of results, we let costs per attribute equal
0.15. These costs are set so that an optimal model
considers only a single attribute. As will be clear from
the results, in any given time period, some percentage
of the individuals will be using a two-attribute model.
This occurs because the individuals continually exper-
iment with new models. Given our assumptions, the
expected accuracy of each individual equals 68.75%.6
Figure 3 shows the average accuracy of the group
(the top line) as well as the moving average accuracy
for each of two individuals under social learning with
individual incentives. The up and down movements in
this average are consistent with the random walk
posited in the previous section. The theoretical results
implied that market incentives should produce higher
group accuracy than individual incentives and that
isolated learning should produce higher group accu-
racy than social learning. We ﬁnd both to be true as
shown in Table 1.Manage. Decis. Econ. 33: 323–334 (2012)
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Figure 3. Social learning, individual incentives with ﬁve equal attributes.
able 1. Group Accuracy for Five Equally
eighted Attributes 101 Individuals, 30,000 Periods
olated,
dividual
Social,
individual
Isolated
market
Social
market
7.39 84.83 96.35 95.44
L. HONG ET AL.330T
W
Is
in
8We also ﬁnd that market incentives result in more
diversity than do individual incentives. The advantage
of market incentives stems from their ability to main-
tain diversity in the population. Recall that in this
example, maximal diversity equals ﬁve. Figures 4 and
5 show the time series for the diversity index for isolated
learning and market incentives (the most diverse popu-
lation) and social learning and individual incentives
(the least diverse). Isolated learning and market incen-
tives produce almost maximal diversity (ﬁve). Not onlyFigure 4. Diversity: isolated learning, mar
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.does social learning produce less diversity, it is also
more volatile. Notice too that the periods of low accu-
racy seen in Figure 3 corresponds to periods of low di-
versity in Figure 3.
Linear Functions with a Dominant Attribute. For
our second class of functions, we consider a function
deﬁned over ﬁve attributes in which one of the attri-
butes is dominant. We consider the speciﬁc class of
functions described previously where
Fb xð Þ ¼ d
X4
i¼1
bixi
" #
;
and b1> b2> b3>b4> 0 and b2 + b3 + b4>b1> b2 +
b3. Recall that the most accurate model considers only
attribute one and is accurate with probability 87.5%.
Here, we ﬁnd that for all of the cases except for marketket incentives with ﬁve equal attributes.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 33: 323–334 (2012)
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is not signiﬁcantly different from this percentage.
The data from the runs show that a strict majority of
the individuals consider only attribute one. However,
under market incentives, with isolated learning, the
average individual accuracy equals only 78.94%. Yet,
the group’s accuracy equals 88.16%, only a slight
improvement over the other scenarios. The market
incentives maintain some diversity as shown in Figure 6.
The amount of diversity exceeds that found in the
theoretical model because some portion of the agents
consider more than one attribute. In fact, the diversity
levels lie in the range that would make it possible for
the collective to be 100% accurate. Yet, they are not.
Thus, it seems that market incentives may produce
sufﬁcient diversity, but they do not always produce an
accurate collective prediction.
General Linear Functions. We next consider a
more general class of linear functions. Here, we allow
the coefﬁcients to be drawn uniformly at random fromFigure 6. Diversity: isolated learning, mark
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.[1, 1], and we increase the number of attributes to
nine. Formally, we let
Fb xð Þ ¼ d
X9
i¼1
bixi
" #
;
where xi is, with equal probability, 1 or 1. In each
run of the model, we drew new coefﬁcients. Thus, some
of the model runs may be like our equal attributes
model, whereas others may have one or two dominant
attributes. Each run of the model consisted of 100,000
periods. We present average data over 200 runs.
Figure 7 shows results on average individual and
group level accuracy as well as diversity. The dark
bars show average individual accuracy, and the light
bars show collective accuracy across the 200 runs.
The graph also includes error bars that mark out two
standard deviations in each direction. The data show
that markets create less accurate individuals, more
diversity, and more accurate groups. Isolated learninget incentives, with one dominant attribute.
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Figure 7. Individual and collective accuracy, diversity
(220 runs).
Figure 8. Correlation between diversity bonus and diversity
index (220 runs).
L. HONG ET AL.332has the same effects, although of less magnitude.
Overall, the results from the computational model
paint a consistent picture. The ordering of the four
scenarios by collective accuracy is identical to their
ordering by the amount of diversity that they maintain.
Market; Isolated Market; Social
 Individual; Isolated
 Individual Social
Somewhat surprisingly, the ordering by individual
accuracy turns out to be the exact reverse. At least in
our model, incentives that produce accurate indivi-
duals prove less capable of producing accurate collec-
tives. Overall, although market incentives and isolated
learning both produce more accuracy markets have a
larger effect because they produce far more diversity
(as measured by the diversity index of the attributes
considered). In fact, market incentives with isolated
learning produce nearly twice the diversity as do
individual incentives and social learning.
This relationship between diversity and group
accuracy can also be seen by plotting the difference
between group accuracy and average individual accu-
racy against the diversity index. Figure 8 shows data
from 200 runs for each scenario. This plot shows that
model diversity, as measured by the diversity index of
the distribution of attributes considered by the indivi-
duals, correlates strongly with what we call the diver-
sity bonus, the difference between group accuracy and
individual accuracy. This correlation holds both
within each scenario and across the four scenarios.
This plot shows how markets create much more model
diversity and a corresponding larger diversity bonus.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Manage. Decis. Econ. 33: 323–334 (2012)
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For our ﬁnal set of experiments, we consider linear
functions with pairwise nonlinear terms. Our functions
take the following form:
F xð Þ ¼
X5
i¼1
bixi þ g12x1x2 þ g34x3x4;
where the bi are uniformly drawn from [1, 1] and
the gij are uniformly drawn from [4, 4]. Here again,
we ﬁnd that isolated information environments main-
tain more diversity and produce greater collective
accuracy. However, the effects of market incentives do
not have as large of an effect on collective accuracy.
In cases with nonlinear terms, collective accuracy
requires that some individual captures each nonlinear
interaction. Markets create incentives to locate those
nonlinear interactions and include those attributes.
However, for an individual learner in isolation, once a
nonlinear effect is located, it will not be abandoned for
the simple reason that dropping an attribute drops both
the linear term and the interaction term. Therefore, the
fact that the market does not improve on individual
learning speaks less to the inability of markets than
to the power of individual, isolated learning in the
presence of nonlinear effects.4. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have constructed a model to explore
how collective accuracy emerges in a model in which
individuals choose models in various informational
INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND EMERGENT COLLECTIVE ACCURACY 333environments under different incentives. We present
two main ﬁndings: First, we ﬁnd that isolated learning
produces greater model diversity and therefore more
accurate collectives. Second, we ﬁnd that market
incentives, in which individuals payoffs are inversely
proportional to the percentage of correct predictors
produce more diversity but less individual accuracy.
This increase in diversity more than offsets the loss
in individual accuracy implying that market incentives
with isolated learning provide the best environment
for collective accuracy to emerge. These results broadly
agree with those derived by Golub and Jackson (Golub
& Jackson, 2010), who study the wisdom of crowds in
social networks. They take the distribution of initial
signals as given and examine how much weight people
should place on the opinions of others. They ﬁnd that
the wisdom of crowds requires vanishing weight on
the most connected people, in other words, more equal
weighting of signals.
We also ﬁnd that although markets incentives
create greater diversity, they do not produce sufﬁcient
diversity for the crowd to be 100% accurate, which
theoretically, they should be able to achieve. In the
case of ﬁve equally weighted attributes, the aggregate
comes close to perfect accuracy, but when we increase
the number of attributes to nine and average across a
variety of functional forms for the outcome function,
accuracy falls to around 90%. Individual accuracy
lies far below that level, implying that collective accu-
racy does in fact emerge, but interestingly, it emerges
partly through a lack of interaction—the isolated
learning—and partly through linked payoffs—the
market incentives.
To see if stronger incentives for diversity would
produce more accurate collectives, we also experimen-
ted with what we call hyper market incentives, in
which the payoff to an individual was proportional to
one over the square of the number of individuals
who predict correctly. These incentives might not be
feasible in practice as payouts could be large if only
a single individual predicted correctly. In such cases,
these incentives will fail to satisfy the balance criterion
from mechanism design (Myerson, 2008). Violations
of the balance criterion are most relevance in market
settings in which resources paid out must equal
resources received. In the context of an organization,
a person may be concerned with reputation enhance-
ment. In such cases, no balance criterion need exist.
And, a lone person who foresees a crash might indeed
earn enormous beneﬁts. Our analysis of hyper market
incentives reveals that they perform only a little better
than our market incentives.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.We see our ﬁndings as suggestive of several direc-
tions for future inquiry, particularly in expanding the
set of possible informational structures and incentives
systems and introducing individual level cost hetero-
geneity. Our results suggest that there probably will
not be a single incentive system that works for all
outcome functions. Thus, it may be optimal for the
incentive system to itself adapt. In addition, although
diversity produces better outcomes, more diversity need
not always be better. The scenarios that we considered
produced insufﬁcient diversity but that does not mean
that all incentive systems and informational structures
would do so. It would be possible as well, to produce
too much diversity, at the expense of a lack of individual
accuracy. An ideal mechanismwould balance the incen-
tives for individual accuracy and for collective diversity
so that wise crowds can emerge.
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1. Henrich (Henrich, 2004) calls this cultural learning.
2. These are equivalent to parimutuel payoffs with the
house taking no payoff. The market incentives scenarios
share several features with the El Farol Problem (Arthur,
1994) and the Minority Game (Challet & Zhang, 1998).
In each of these models, individuals have incentives to
construct diverse models and can earn high payoffs by
doing so. In those models, the outcome being predicted
and the number of people at El Farol depend on the
actions of the individuals. Here, the outcome occurs inde-
pendently of the predictions of the individuals.
3. In Political Science, this measure also captures the effective
number of parties, and in biology, the identical measure
called Simpson’s Index is used to capture species diversity.
See Page (Page, 2010) for a survey of diversity measures.
4. The upper bound can be attained by setting p1 ¼ 14þ 3e
and pj ¼ 14 e for j= 2, 3, 4. The lower bound can be
attained by setting p1 ¼ 12 e1 and p2 ¼ 12þ e1  e2  e3,
p3 = e3 and p4 = e4.
5. These were run in both Python and Netlogo. Code is
available from the authors.
6. For each of the four scenarios, the average accuracy lied
within 0.2% of that value.REFERENCES
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